The English-Only Movement: A Communication Analysis of Changing Perceptions of Language Vitality

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This paper reexamines the potential impact of the English-only movement on linguistic minorities and Anglos' perceptions of their own and minority groups' language vitality. Of particular interest is the Hispanic population—the fastest growing minority in the U.S. Communication scholars have paid only scant attention to the English-only movement and how it affects the social and communication climate for Latinos. However, literature reviews prepared for the American Psychological Association and for Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages (in 1991 and 1995, respectively) concluded that English-only initiatives have negative consequences for limited-English proficiency groups. Revisiting this still-growing issue in the light of more recent studies across disciplines and media reports, we examine how Anglo support for English-only policies limits the use, promotion, and salience of minority languages like Spanish in institutional settings and in the linguistic landscape and suggest directions for future research.

Communication scholars have paid scant attention to the English-only Movement (see, however, Giles, Williams, Mackie, & Rosselli, 1995). Instead, this issue has typically been a focus of theoretical and research interest for a variety of other social scientific domains, such as the sociology of language, political science, education, linguistics, and social psychology. For example, in a review of psychology and education research about English-only initiatives, undertaken on behalf of the American Psychological Association (APA), Padilla, Lindholm, Chen, Duran, Hakuta, Lambert, and Tucker (1991) found no favorable evidence to support their...
implementation. They argued that research on the impact of English-only initiatives showed that they result in negative consequences for psychological development, intergroup relations, academic achievement, and health service delivery to limited-proficiency English populations in the U.S.

Consequently, the authors advised that it would be unethical for the APA to support English-only initiatives. Dicker, Jackson, Ricento, and Romstedt (1995) articulated the (sociolinguistic) response of Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL), also labeling this a “destructive social movement” (p. 3). Moreover, media reports about English-only issues, for example, English-only SAT tests, English-only driving tests, repeal of language rules in government, and personal discrimination based on English proficiency (Cooper, 1999; Sack, 1999; Westphal, 2000), continue to make the English-only issue salient. Indeed, at least 20 daily newspapers, including the Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, USA Today, and Washington Post, hold an editorial policy opposed to official English (Trulin, 2000). Despite this, and the arguments against the English-only movement provided by Padilla, Dicker, and their respective colleagues, English-only policies and related initiatives have continued to proliferate over the past decade.

Our paper relates explicitly to the English-only movement and language issues in the U.S., and to a lesser degree in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, many of the concerns discussed here with regard to language purism have relevance to similar international contexts, such as language conflicts between Spanish and Catalan speakers in Spain, and Dutch, Flemish, and French language issues in Holland and Belgium (Jernudd, 1989). More recently, Germany has taken issue with the language requirements of European Union meetings (English, French, and host country languages), threatening not to participate (“Germany: Language dispute,” 1999). Therefore, the English-only movement in the U.S. is just one example of the tendency for insecure language majorities to support moves to limit the use, promotion, and salience of minority languages in institutional settings.

Unfortunately, though, communication scholars have yet to make a definitive stand on the English-only controversy, either by setting a research agenda related to English-only initiatives or by making policy recommendations. This is surprising indeed considering that the English-only phenomenon is an inherently communicative issue. Language and communication convey messages key to personal and social identity. Miller (2000) comments that “what seems inescapable is the understanding that our identities are shaped by and through our use of language. And so the question of which language is in use is an important one in the identity stakes” (p. 74).

The way that social identity is communicated and constructed through everyday practices within social institutions (e.g., workplace and school), through the mass media, and in the linguistic landscape of a community, influences how linguistic groups view themselves, each other, and their respective socioeconomic vitality. This, in turn, affects the ways in which language groups behave toward each other. As a communicative strategy, the English-only movement is undoubtedly the response of the dominant English-speaking majority to what is perceived as the increasing vitality of Spanish-speaking groups.
Official English and English-only legislation have pragmatically and symbolically elevated English to a high status position while relegating other languages like Spanish—and their speakers—to lower status positions. As our discussion will show, these language groups present a threat neither to the English language nor to the dominant position of the Anglo majority. In fact, as Ricento (1995) noted, “the unchallenged dominance of English is so unquestioned that most Americans, when asked, assume that English is already the official language” (p. 10).

By contrast, we believe recent moves to abolish bilingual education and limit affirmative action will continue to erode educational achievement and self-esteem among Hispanic groups. The existing economic position of most Latinos is poor (Walsh, 2000) and the prospect of its improvement minimal in the short term. Additionally, the salience of Spanish in some mass media outlets and in the linguistic landscape of areas heavily populated by Hispanics masks the inevitable language shift to English occurring among Hispanic groups over the first three generations of immigrants (Rodriguez, 1999). What is lost in all this is the recognition of the right of all citizens to speak their heritage language and preserve their culture. It is apparent that the demographic shifts now taking place in the U.S., and a perceived rise in Hispanic social, political, and economic status continue to fuel fears among some Anglo Americans.

*Demographic Shifts and English-Only Initiatives*

Current census data predict profound demographic shifts in the ethnic topography of the U.S. population over the next 100 years. According to census data, the top six languages other than English in the U.S. are Spanish, French, German, Italian, Chinese, and Tagalog, with Spanish speakers outnumbering all other minority languages by at least 250% (Bruno, 1993). By the middle of the 21st century, language minorities will probably comprise more than half of the total U.S. population. The Hispanic population will triple, the African American population will double, and the Asian Pacific populations will quadruple. In contrast, the non-Hispanic White population will increase only 5% (Bourhis & Marshall, 1999).

Although over three quarters of all Hispanic peoples live in just four states—California, Texas, New York, and Florida—with few exceptions, most states have considered legislating official English at one time or another (Fishman, 1988). Presently, 23 states declare English as the official language (Joubert, 1997). This includes California, the state with the highest Hispanic population in the U.S. (approximately 10 million—32.7% of California’s population [Verdin, 2000]) and the most linguistically diverse state in the U.S., with more than 200 languages in evidence (Ferrell & Hotz, 2000). As a case study of English-only initiatives, California may provide some insight in terms of future trends in other states with high Hispanic populations. Indeed, California exhibits a history of state initiatives affecting language minorities with regard to government services and education. In 1986, Proposition 63 introduced official English, Proposition 187 (1994) attempted to stop public benefits for illegal immigrants, Proposition 209 (1997) ended affirmative action, and, most recently, Proposition 227 (1998) banned bilingual education in elementary schools.

At the federal level, many official English bills have been introduced in Con-
gress in recent years. In the 105th Congress alone, five such bills were listed—all authored by Republicans (Cantu, 1998). In 1996, one bill passed through the House of Representatives, but was not taken up in the Senate (Dicker, 1998). At this writing, there are four official English bills pending in the 106th Congress. Although, as yet, English-only legislation at the federal level continues to fail, such bills and legislation relating to bilingual education have been repeatedly introduced and avidly encouraged by highly vocal English-only advocates (e.g., English First and U.S. English). These and other legislative initiatives appear to embody a pattern of concern among largely White, middle-class voters about their position relative to other ethnic groups, particularly Latinos.

Although scholars working in education (Hakuta, 1999) and social psychology (Wright & Taylor, 1995; Wright, Taylor, & Ruggiero, 1996) continue to underscore the pernicious nature of an English-only agenda (particularly in the area of bilingual education), little communication-based empirical research addresses the impact of English-only issues and how they affect the communicative and societal climate of Hispanic groups. This represents a major oversight. Therefore, using vitality theory (e.g., Giles & Johnson, 1981, 1987; Harwood, Giles, & Bourhis, 1994), we discuss the meaning and impact of the English-only movement as a communicative phenomenon and suggest how research in this important area may proceed.

Vitality Theory: Background and Concepts

The concept of ethnolinguistic vitality was introduced by Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor (1977) and provided the means to investigate sociostructural factors affecting the strength of language groups within diverse group settings. The level of an ingroup’s vitality contributes to the extent to which it behaves as a distinct collective. A language group with high vitality is more likely to survive and flourish as a collective entity in an intergroup context. By contrast, groups with low vitality are likely to disappear as discrete linguistic entities in intergroup settings (Harwood, Giles, & Bourhis, 1994). Language becomes a focal point for dissent when dominant groups feel a sense of insecurity because they fear what they perceive as increased language vitality of other ethnic and social groups. Language vitality can be assessed both objectively and subjectively.

Objective assessments of vitality. Conflicts about language shift take place in the context of distinct historical and sociocultural structures. Structural factors, including the demographic salience, status, and institutional control of language groups, provide potential indicators of objective linguistic vitality. Demographic salience is literally the number of members comprising a language group and their distribution or concentration throughout a community or nation. Also of interest are birthrate and immigration patterns of language groups vis-à-vis the dominant group or groups. Institutional control refers to the group’s presence and support in political, media, educational institutions and linguistic landscape. It is characterized by the salience of group members in positions of power such that one group is represented disproportionately relative to another and, therefore, able to wield more power (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). Those groups who possess institutional support and control will also exhibit high levels of linguistic, social, and economic
status. Indeed the superior status of a particular language group relative to another may be epitomized by legislation intended to promote or preserve its language—as in English-only laws (Cobarubias & Fishman, 1983).

**Subjective perceptions of group vitality.** Subjective vitality is defined as language group members’ assessments of their own and other language groups’ vitality with regard to their relative sociostructural positions—demographic salience, institutional power, and status. Giles et al. (1977) argued that language groups provide social identities that contribute to the self-concept; therefore, group members strive for favorable social identities relative to others. Social identity is defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). Social identity can emanate from a variety of groups, including race or language group. For example, a study of perceptions of linguistic vitality among Mexican Americans (Gao, Schmidt, & Gudykunst, 1994) showed that respondents perceived English and Anglos as more vital than Spanish and Mexican Americans. Findings indicated that perceived vitality among Mexican Americans was primarily predicted by level of ethnic identity—respondents who identified strongly with their ethnic group perceived their group as exhibiting higher linguistic vitality.

When members of language groups sense that their vitality is low, or when another language group threatens it, group members may feel their social identity to be negatively valued and act to change their situation or that of other groups.

**Strategies for change.** The types of strategies used to gain or maintain positive social identity depend on the perceived nature of the power and status of other social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Sociostructural features (demography, institutional control, and status) influence a group’s perceptions of linguistic vitality—how well it acts and flourishes as a distinct collective. Because language is bound up with social identity, subjective perceptions of language vitality influence whether people promote, maintain, or lose their distinctive language or culture.

When members of a language minority become cognitively aware of alternatives to negatively valued social identities, they may employ three types of strategies for change. The first is **assimilation** whereby minority group members attempt to distance themselves from their group and associate with the dominant group by adopting their cultural practices, including language. For example, a Peruvian immigrant who laments his 12-year-old sister’s rejection of their heritage language, comments, “She only speaks Spanish to our aunt; she can’t read or write (in Spanish) . . . . To tell the truth, she’s ashamed of it. She’d be the black sheep of her friends if she spoke Spanish around them” (quoted by Lynch, 2000, p. D3).

The second strategy for change is **social creativity.** Members of language groups who perceive themselves as possessing moderate vitality may seek to improve their perception of self by using their linguistic divergence to establish and maintain cultural identity. Sociolinguistic studies have identified a variety of diverse linguistic dialects among people of Mexican descent that reflect their heterogeneous cultural identities (Penalosa, 1980). Often, these dialects, such as Spanglish, serve to counteract the dominant language and create a counterhegemonic vernacular speech (Padilla, 1997). This type of vernacular speech affirms the cultural
community and cultural identification, often building strength for the third strategy in the form of social competition or political change (Delgado, 1998).

Subordinate language groups may attempt to raise themselves to a position of equality or domination by seeking the redistribution of scarce resources, such as political power, wealth, and status. As we discuss in more detail later, some Hispanic groups are already beginning to use such strategies, particularly in the political arena.

When minority language groups appear to assert themselves, the dominant group may choose either to facilitate or to control and minimize change. Perceptions of subjective vitality are driven by the everyday experiences of members of linguistic groups who compare their own group with others. Therefore, Anglos living in a community where the Hispanic population is in the majority may easily overestimate the overall Hispanic population throughout the U.S. (Johnson, 2000). Consequently, a mismatch may arise between the objective vitality of a language group and subjective perceptions of the vitality of that same group (Harwood et al., 1994). Sometimes perceptions of subjective vitality (rather than objective vitality) drive group members’ communication practices. Put simply, if Anglos believe that Spanish is likely to overwhelm English (even if objective evidence suggests that it is not likely), they may take steps to limit the promotion and use of Spanish. There are several linguistic contexts in which subjective perceptions of group vitality are cultivated—in schools, the workplace, via the media, and, as discussed above, in the neighborhood. One other way that language is salient in a community and in daily interpersonal experience is in the “linguistic landscape,” that is, the visual evidence of language.

Landry and Bourhis (1997) developed the innovative concept of the linguistic landscape as part of people’s interpersonal network of linguistic contacts. The language of public signs and symbols, billboards, street names, mail advertising, government information, and notifications form the aggregate linguistic landscape of any given area. Linguistic landscape can serve as information about the linguistic characteristics of the region; more importantly, it may also symbolize the strength or weakness of competing linguistic groups with regard to language vitality. Therefore, for dominant language groups, the provision of signs, materials, or advertising in languages other than their own may fuel discrimination. For example, in California (Monterey Park) Asian language books were removed from the library (Padilla, 1991), and laws have been proposed banning or limiting commercial business signs in languages other than English (Salazar, 1989). In 1984, the author of an early English language amendment, Senator Walter Huddleston (D-KY), registered his disapproval of the amount of non-English federal forms and publications saying, “The non-English materials which I have received are in a stack that is about three feet high, and we are adding to it almost daily” (quoted in Tatalovich, 1995, p.12). This represents one type of response from members of dominant language groups based on subjective perceptions of one indicator of minority group vitality. The broader conceptual relationships described by vitality theory are summarized in Figure 1, and readers might find it useful to refer to this, and its inherent relationships, as the paper unfolds.
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Language and Perceptions of Intergroup Vitality

We have argued that perceptions of subjective linguistic vitality of both dominant and minority language group members are related to levels of social identity. Social identity influences and is also influenced by language salience in the daily, interpersonal experiences of linguistic contexts—school, workplace, media portrayals, neighborhood, and linguistic landscape. These, in turn, affect and are affected by varied behavioral responses from both the dominant language group and minority groups. Members of the dominant language group may choose either to promote bilingualism or to limit the maintenance, use and salience of minority languages. Minority group members, on the other hand, might respond by assimilating, enacting social creativity practices, or by engaging in social competition. Finally, these responses, are related to macro-sociocultural forces incorporating measures to maintain the status quo, or to promote change in socioeconomic power, immigration policies, and in the political, educational, and media institutions, for example. Thus, the cycle begins again; maintenance of the status quo or the promotion of change at the macrosocietal level may foster changed perceptions of intergroup linguistic vitality and so forth.

The English-only movement is one such macrolevel response emanating from changing perceptions of vitality. The apparent salience of minority languages alongside subjective perceptions of growing language-group vitality stimulate concerns among some Englos about the status of English. To what extent are these concerns based on changes in the objective vitality of Spanish-speaking groups?
Objective Linguistic Vitality Among Hispanic Groups

Levels of objective vitality of language groups are related to the presence or absence of three sociocultural factors: changing demographics, socioeconomic status, and institutional support.

Demographic salience. In terms of demographic proportions, although Anglos still represent the linguistic majority, they are already a minority in parts of California (e.g., Dana Point, Texas (e.g., El Paso), and Florida (e.g., Miami) and will lose overall majority status over time. A higher birthrate among Latinos is a key component in this change. For example, from 1990 to 1996, more than 44% of babies born in California were Latino compared to 38% Anglo. Additionally, a continued influx of Spanish-speaking immigrants from Mexico and other Central and South American countries bolster the increasing Hispanic population (California Research Bureau, 1999).

Socioeconomic status. Although there is some variance in economic vitality among Hispanic peoples, generally speaking they tend to do less well than Anglos. Nationally, Hispanics are overrepresented as unskilled workers (29% of Hispanic men and 14% of women compared to 18% of non-Hispanic White men and 6% of women, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996). Hispanic unemployment rates consistently surpass national averages (Johnson, 2000). Additionally, census data for 1996 show over half of all Hispanic family incomes to be below $25,000 annually compared to approximately 20% for all non-Hispanic White family incomes. With regard to poverty, Puerto Ricans fare the worst of all Latinos, with a family poverty rate of 36%. On the other hand, Cuban Americans fare the best economically, with an annual income below $25,000 of 38%, compared to 53% for Mexican Americans and 55% for Puerto Ricans (and 22% for non-Hispanic Whites). By contrast, 30% of Cuban Americans command annual incomes of more than $50,000 (compared to Mexican Americans at 17% and Puerto Ricans at 21%). However, 44% of non-Hispanic Whites earn incomes above $50,000 (Johnson, 2000). The Federal Reserve’s most recent survey of household finances showed that Whites, African-Americans, and Asians all gained during 1995–1998. However, the median Latino household net worth fell by 24% (Walsh, 2000).

An assessment of the economic well-being of Latino people in California, specifically Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Ventura counties (Waldinger & Bozorgmehr, 1996), shows that although they make up 40% of the workforce, Hispanics are at the very bottom of the earnings ladder. The authors argue that although many Mexican Americans are taking steps to adapt, they do not reap economic benefits as a result. Moreover, Latino income levels are expected to continue to trail behind those of Whites into the 21st century (California Research Bureau, 1999).

Hispanic Institutional Support and Control

Politics. The Hispanic population potentially represents a considerable voting bloc (5.6% of registered voters nationwide and 14% in California [Verdin, 2000]). About 150,000 Latinos will reach voting age every year for the next decade in California (Wagner, 1996), and media reports provide some evidence that they are likely to vote (Branigan, 1998; Del Olmo, 1998; Verdin, 2000). Apparently, politicians are
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courting the Hispanic vote (Thurman, 1999), and Hispanic politicians appear more salient (Bryce, 1996; Verdin, 2000). For example, in recent years the California State Assembly has seen two Latino speakers (Rodriguez, 1998) and California Hispanics hold 762 elective offices statewide, and 6 of the state’s 52 congressional members are Hispanic (Verdin, 2000). Regarding these political developments, California Representative Loretta Sanchez observed, “I think that this will also happen in New York, in Chicago, in Texas, and in Florida. California is maybe just 10 years ahead” (Verdin, 2000).

However, with regard to mobilizing for social change, Latinos are unlike other language groups (cf. Olsak, 1998). Latinos exhibit low levels of involvement in political organizations, with only a few underresourced advocacy groups (Santoro, 1999). In an effort to counter this lack of involvement at a local level, the city council of El Cenizo, Texas, recently introduced an ordinance that all city business would be conducted in Spanish with English translations (Kolker, 1999). The town was incorporated only 10 years ago, and, therefore, its population is almost entirely Spanish speaking. The mayor of the city hopes that this move will increase both civic participation and understanding of the political process.

That said, the horror of the Washington-based English advocacy group, U.S. English, concerning this particular incident would not seem to be well founded; in general, Hispanic voters have not exercised their voting rights in a significant fashion (Seib, 1996). If and when they do, it may make a difference. A study of the Latino struggle against English-only laws (Santoro, 1999) suggests that Latino voting blocs and state legislators have helped limit legislative passage of English-only initiatives. Attempts to introduce English-only legislation in Texas have consistently failed because of the politically well-organized Hispanic population in that area (Santoro, 1999). Anglo politicians, looking for votes, may be reluctant to declare their support for English-only initiatives in constituencies with significant Hispanic populations. This suggests that Latino politicians, operating within the realms of institutional politics, can influence government action relating to English-only legislation. Because of the popularity of these initiatives with many Anglos, however, Latino influence occurs only in contexts where advocates of an English-only policy are not able to circumvent legislative channels by referenda (as in California).

Media. With regard to interpersonal networks of linguistic contacts and their potential influence on subjective perceptions of vitality, the relative preponderance of Spanish-language television channels, radio stations, and newspapers provides opportunities for daily contact with the language for both dominant and subordinate groups. Kim (1995) argues that new immigrants can use these forms of mass media to support their sense of identity as well as to gain information about the host society during the initial phases of adaptation. Harwood (1997, 1999) also suggests that media viewing choices may be driven by social identity motivations. Group members seek out media content in which they are both overrepresented and favorably portrayed in order to maintain a positive social identity. This is not surprising in light of research (Maass, 1999; Santa Ana, 1999) that shows how minority groups or outgroups can be subtly denigrated in the media by the use of certain types of discourse and framing (for a summary of
media representations in relation to vitality, see Abrams & Eveland, 2000).

Relatedly, Yaeger-Dror (1988) studied Israeli immigrants from Arabic-speaking countries and found that their linguistic vitality improved markedly over time. Originally, their form of Hebrew suffered low objective language vitality compared to the dominant form because it was spoken by a group of lower social and economic class. Due to a higher birthrate, the immigrant group grew in numbers and gradually improved their social status. Initially, those who associated freely with the host culture tended to favor the host form of speech. However, despite some convergence to the host language, language maintenance among the immigrants was evidenced by the increasing prevalence of their speech form in the media, particularly in pop songs and, to a lesser extent, in television interviews.

Hispanic media offer institutional support for the Spanish-language minority, providing an important counterpoint to dominant media outlets in English. Spanish-language TV enjoys considerable financial success (Laboy, 1997), and English-language stations are beginning to simulcast sports and other shows in Spanish (Brodesser, 1997). Chevron recently began airing their commercials with the cartoon car speaking Spanish with English subtitles (Johnson, 1999). There is also evidence of a crossover to the mainstream of Spanish-language pop artists (e.g., Ricky Martin; see Harrison & Craughwell, 1999).

However, despite the increased presence of Spanish media, it appears that these media are well used only by newer Spanish-speaking immigrants. Second- and third-generation Hispanic immigrants have either already lost their first language or speak it only in their home when conversing with older relatives (Lynch, 2000). Kim (1995) suggests that as newer immigrants learn the majority language and progress toward adaptation, the host media may take over part of that function; therefore, their media use may more closely mirror that of the general population reflecting age and socioeconomic class. This reliance on heritage language in the early stages of adaptation may also occur with regard to Spanish in the linguistic landscape.

**Spanish in the linguistic landscape.** In a study suggestive of the potential importance of linguistic landscape with regard to perceptions of language vitality, Landry and Bourhis (1997) reanalyzed data obtained from grades 11 and 12 Francophone students in 50 schools across 11 provinces in Canada. The 2,010 students came from regions where Francophones represented between 1% and 99% of the population. Results showed that the linguistic landscape (public signs, shop signs, advertising, billboards, street names, place names) was associated with subjective linguistic vitality among Francophone students. The authors also suggest that linguistic landscape may be related to language use, possibly providing an impetus to the use of their heritage language. They conclude that “High vitality dominant groups... have a vested interest in maintaining their own group language on public signs, especially in ethnolinguistically heterogeneous sectors of their national or regional territory” (p. 46).

In relation to the linguistic landscape in the U.S., in spite of the prevalence of official-English statutes, government and public utility information often appears in Spanish (and other languages). Signs and billboards in Spanish are not unusual, particularly in areas heavily populated by Hispanic people. Business (e.g., ATM
services) and shopping can be conducted in Spanish. No research has yet assessed the influence of the linguistic landscape with regard to objective and subjective perceptions of English- and Spanish-language vitality and support for English-only or official-English measures. However, as discussed above, proponents of English-only measures have vigorously objected to the use of other languages in government documents. Also, Proposition 227 (limiting bilingual education) forbids the use of Spanish-language visual aids in California elementary schools.

Some academics argue that Spanish in the linguistic landscape will die out over time anyway as immigrants learn English and become naturalized (Rodriguez, 1999). Spanish on signs and in shops is expected to remain prevalent only in areas heavily populated by relatively new Hispanic immigrants.

**Education**

Language policy in the educational domain has been one of the most contentious areas of policy debate. It is argued that the language of the school is important for several reasons. Scholars note that the school environment is an important arena for contact between linguistic groups and, hence, language shift. The language of education also is suggested to have important implications for social (e.g., identity, self-esteem, and psychological adjustment) and cognitive (e.g., academic achievement) reasons. One way in which language is learned, maintained, and accorded objective status is through its use in educational institutions. Additionally, interpersonal networks of daily contact with Spanish speakers in educational institutions influence subjective perceptions of Spanish language vitality. For example, until very recently, bilingual education programs were the norm in California’s K through 12 grade schools. In geographic areas where Hispanic groups represent a majority, Spanish was spoken commonly inside and outside of the classroom (as well as at home), potentially providing a linguistic ambiance favoring this minority language (cf. Rodriguez, Diaz, Duran, & Espinosa, 1995; Hayes-Bautista & Rodriguez, 1995).

**Social outcomes.** In a general sense, language is not just a tool for communication or a system of symbols; it is a component of culture in which social identity is embedded (Cantoni, 1998). Judd (1987) illustrates this when he comments that language “is a symbolic system laden with emotional attachments that can arouse the deepest passions” (p. 113). For many Hispanics, Spanish is considered a deeply meaningful part of their social and personal identity (Johnson, 2000). “Ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity—I am my language” (Anzaldúa, quoted in Johnson, 2000, p. 177). Furthermore, the connection between heritage language instruction and self-esteem is widely argued and debated (e.g., Alexander & Baker, 1992). As part of a longitudinal program of research, one study (Wright & Taylor, 1995) comparing Inuit, White, and mixed-heritage children found that children educated in their heritage language showed an increase in self-esteem after 1 year. Inuit and mixed-heritage children educated in a second language did not.

Still in Canada, Clément and colleagues (Clément & Noels, 1992; Noels & Clément, 1996) conducted a series of studies on the effects of increased confidence with a second language on identity variations and psychological adjustment in the con-
text of a bilingual (French-English) university. Patterns observed for these non-linguistic outcomes suggest a preponderant influence of ethno-linguistic vitality. Canadian Anglophones, the majority group in this case, show that self-confidence increases with increased contact with Francophones. Furthermore, identification with Francophones and psychological adjustment increase with greater linguistic confidence, without erosion of the identification to the first language group. The same pattern is observed for Francophones, in this case the minority group, except that the process also involves a lessening of the identification to their own group. In a further study, Clément, Michaud, and Noels (1998) showed that a lack of support from their own group was related to depression among minority Francophones, whereas a lack of support from the majority group entailed relatively high levels of stress.

This suggests that the recent move to limit bilingual education in California, and elsewhere, is potentially damaging to the self-esteem and social identity of Hispanic language groups and the vitality of the Spanish language (Macedo, 1991; Padilla, 1991). As early as 1966, a National Education Association study of teaching Spanish to Spanish speakers concluded that unilingual English classes contributed to an “inferiority complex” among Mexican American children. Additionally, the authors argued that “the harm done the Mexican American child linguistically is paralleled by the harm done to him as a person” (p. 134). This helped lead to the Bilingual Education Act (1968), which provided grants to support programs for Limited English Proficiency (LEP) students. Subsequently, various state legislatures introduced bilingual education in a variety of forms. Approximately, 75% of all LEP students are Spanish speakers (Hakuta, 1999).

Cognitive outcomes. For supporters of bilingual education, the ideal approach is that of language maintenance (Bourhis & Marshall, 1999) whereby students receive significant amounts of instruction in their first language while developing academic proficiency in English and their first language. This contrasts markedly with the English immersion approach favored by opponents of bilingual education and recent advocates of English-only. Opponents of language maintenance argue that exposing children to their first language in the educational environment limits their exposure to English, delays the acquisition of English, and hinders academic achievement. They also argue that bilingual education is ineffective and a waste of resources and that it devalues and displaces English as the language of the U.S. (Hakuta, 1999). Research evidence does not support these criticisms.

A National Research Council (1997) review of programs intended for language minority children found favorable effects with regard to bilingual education (see Genesee & Gandara, 2000). Children in bilingual programs show increased academic achievement, dual-language proficiency, and cognitive flexibility (Franquiz, 1998; Greene, 1998; Padilla et al., 1991; Rodriguez et al., 1995; Willig, 1987). Research relating to other ethnic groups and bilingual education supports these findings. Winsler and his colleagues (1999) found that bilingual education does not seem to diminish children’s proficiency in the first language. Relative to children who remain at home, Mexican American children who attended bilingual preschool for 1 year did not evidence Spanish-language loss, but showed significant and greater increases in English-language proficiency. Additionally, research on Asian
American children suggests that bilingualism may be particularly important for academic achievement if parents are not proficient in English (Mouw & Xie, 1999).

With regard to the charge that first language maintenance hinders cognitive and academic development, Wright, Taylor, and Ruggiero (1996) conducted a study to assess intellectual potential among Inuit children in Canada. Groups of Inuit children instructed in their heritage language were compared with Inuit, White, and mixed-heritage children instructed in English or French over a 2-year period. Language of instruction and teacher’s ethnicity did not affect scores—the Inuit children scored consistently better or as well as comparable White children living in the same geographical (but less isolated) area of Canada.

The most recent study in this program of research involving Inuit children (Wright, Taylor, & Macarthur, 2000) examined the impact of early heritage- and second-language education on heritage- and second-language development among Inuit, White, and mixed-heritage (Inuit-White) children. Children in an arctic community were tested in English, French, and Inuttitut at the beginning and end of each of the first 3 school years. Compared with Inuit in heritage language and mixed-heritage children in a second language, Inuit in second-language classes (English or French) showed poorer heritage-language skills and poorer second-language acquisition. By contrast, Inuit children in Inuttitut classes showed heritage-language skills equal to or better than mixed-heritage children and Whites educated in their heritage languages. Therefore, the findings support the argument that early instruction exclusively in a dominant language can lead to subtractive bilingualism among minority-language children, and that heritage-language education may reduce this culturally debilitating process.

The above discussion of potential social and cognitive effects of language choice in the classroom shows the precarious position of a minority group. Whereas the acquisition of a dominant group language may foster positive psychological outcomes in terms of overall adaptation (see also, Noels, Pon, & Clément, 1996, for a Chinese example), side effects include the loss of the heritage identity, possibly paired with feelings of depression. When considering the effects of linguistic and educational policies, the moderating factor seems to be relative vitality.

Buttressing this argument, Hakuta (1999) argues that the single most important obstruction to the success of bilingual education among Spanish-language groups is poverty. Approximately one third of Hispanic families live in poverty, with Hispanic family poverty rates more than three times higher than non-Hispanic Whites (Johnson, 2000). One reason for low income is less education among Mexican Americans—in 1995, 47% of Mexican Americans of 25 years of age completed high school compared to 86% of non-Hispanic Whites (Johnson, 2000). Clearly, bilingual education, within a context sheltering the first language, at least initially (Clément, 1986), may provide one way of changing the educational and economic profile of the Hispanic population.

The shift to English. Research also shows that concerns about the English language becoming displaced are generally unjustified. Language minorities (including Hispanics) shift to English within a generation or two, and there is no opposition among Spanish speakers to learning English; indeed, there is a growing (unmet) demand for English-as-second-language classes (Amastae, 1990; Brandt, 1990;
A recent study conducted by the National Immigrant Forum (Rodriguez, 1999) found that “95.7% of third generation Latino children spoke English ‘well,’ ‘very well,’ or exclusively. The idea of non-English speaking clusters remaining over generations is simply untrue” (p. 3).

In a study of Cuban families in Miami, Lambert and Taylor (1996) found that working class mothers encourage their children to learn English in order to succeed (using a subtractive form of bilingualism) whereas middle-class mothers encourage both English and Spanish competence (as a form of additive/maintenance bilingualism). Immigrants are well aware that their ability to speak English determines whether or not they can participate fully in American society. Even children in the eighth and ninth grade are cognizant of the need to speak English in American society. For example, Dicker (1995) reports a study of 5,000 eighth- and ninth-grade immigrants from a variety of countries, the majority of whom prefer to speak English over their native language. An additional study (Ruggiero, Taylor, & Lambert, 1996) highlights the role of discrimination in the process of culture maintenance. The results suggest that Hispanic Americans are less likely to maintain their heritage culture (including language) the more they experience personal discrimination. The authors argue that the findings fly in the face of the idea that changing cultural practices is a matter of choice rather than a matter of intimidation on behalf of host groups.

English-only proponents often associate Hispanic groups’ wish to maintain their language with rejection of the English language and American cultural values. However, a study (Taylor, Lambert, & Wallace, 1996) investigating the precise meaning that ethnic groups in Miami (Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Haitian women) attach to their culture and language and the views of majority groups (White and African American women) revealed an unanticipated level of consensus. All agreed that it is appropriate for heritage cultures and languages to be maintained in the home. Also, there was agreement that heritage language should be maintained in contexts outside the home where the language group is in the majority. Additionally, although the Spanish speakers wished to maintain their own distinctive culture and language, they also believed (with Whites and African Americans) that, in the public domain, the English language should predominate.

In sum. Based on indicators of objective language group vitality (demography, socioeconomic status, and institutional control) overall, Spanish-language groups do not present a significant challenge to the dominance of English-language groups. Although the Hispanic population is growing significantly, and their presence is felt in the mass media and linguistic landscape of some communities, their political and socioeconomic power is still very limited. In terms of achievements in education, Hispanic groups are lagging significantly behind non-Hispanic Whites. In contrast, the preponderance of English-only initiatives suggests that some Anglos’s subjective perceptions of Spanish-language groups’ vitality are fueling uncertainty about their own linguistic vitality and economic and political status. These concerns about language, demographic, or sociostructural changes overlap; thus, proponents of English-only policies, such as U.S. English and English
First, for example, are closely associated with anti-immigration organizations (Acuna & Rodriguez, 1998; Padilla et al., 1991; Stefancic & Delgado, 1996; Zentella, 1997).

Proponents of English-only and related initiatives offer distinct arguments for their perspective that are not always reflected in the research about who supports the English-only movement and why. These arguments and research relating to support for English-only policies are discussed next.

**English-Only Arguments**
Arguments for English-only typically focus on the supposed need to have one language in order to provide national unity (Judd, 1987). To achieve this national unity, this argument reasons, immigrants must have the responsibility of learning English upon arrival to this country, just as they have had to in the past. Having all citizens speak the same language provides the country with stability—economically, socially, and politically. Continuing this line of thought, the proponents of English-only initiatives believe that immigrants who do not learn English will face discrimination and segregation. By declaring English the official language, the immigrants will be forced to learn the language and therefore be able to participate in the English-speaking “mainstream.” It seems that supporters of this argument are not aware of the thousands of immigrants (at times, estimates of 40,000 in Los Angeles County alone) waiting for placement in an English instruction class (Dicker, 1995).

In line with the national unity and antidiscrimination arguments, proponents of English-only often advance the “melting pot” theory of immigration and American society, that is, assimilation into the “wider” American society, understood to be the White, English-speaking facet of U.S. society. Historically, the argument posits, the U.S. achieved its greatness by its ability to assimilate large numbers of immigrants from a variety of countries and cultures. By allowing immigrants to not learn English the dissimilarities between immigrants and mainstream America are enhanced instead of melted together. This leads to another argument of the English-only movement, fear of ethnic confrontations and cultural separation.

Politicians have noted at various times that cultural dissimilarities enhanced by language differences may lead to ethnic confrontations, or the “Balkanization” and “linguistic separation” of the United States (Judd, 1987, p. 119). The politicians who invoke this argument often cite examples from other countries that experienced polarization of language groups and demands for self-government (e.g., Canada, Belgium). The only way to subvert these problems, they claim, is to declare English the official language. However, we have seen that ethnic groups who are English speakers may still separate themselves, or “be separated” from society due to ethnic discrimination and racism. Clearly, supporters of this argument do not realize the loss of culture experienced by immigrants who have assimilated, or the desire of many new immigrants to maintain their culture as well as integrate themselves (including their home culture) into their lives in the United States. As Dicker (1995) points out, bilingualism is unifying, not alienating; it allows individuals to be a part of two speech communities, instead of only one.
Research on Support for English-Only Initiatives

Empirical research about support for English offers only somewhat equivocal findings. However, two main, contrasting explanations for support for English-only or official English have emerged. The first identifies support for English-only as a feature of support for American identity and patriotism (cf. Citrin, 1990; Citrin, Hass, Muste, & Reingold, 1994; Citrin, Reingold, Walters, & Green, 1990). The second explanation for support for English-only is that it is embedded in insecurity, 1988; Howe, 1990; Padilla et al., 1991; Zentella, 1990).

Citrin, Reingold, Walters, and Green (1990) employed survey data to demonstrate that the way in which an issue is framed is a key determinant in the success of English-only initiatives. The researchers found that an important reason for the popularity of “official English” is a desire “to reaffirm an attachment to a traditional image of Americanism that now seems vulnerable” (p. 536). Following this line of reasoning, Frendreis and Tatalovich (1997) examined the extent of, and basis for, mass support for official English. By analyzing data from the 1992 National Election Study (NES), they found that support for the official national language is broad (64.5%). In addition, they highlight the results of a California poll showing that four times as many respondents (73.9%) favored as opposed the English-only proposal. The analysis revealed a positive correlation between (a) being older, less educated, and White with supporting official English; (b) being White and disliking illegal immigrants; and (c) disliking illegal immigrants and support for official English. Frendreis and Tatalovich concluded that official English concerns relate to symbolism about cultural identity and national identity.

The “new racism.” Huddy and Sears (1995) examined the attitudes toward bilingual education of 347 Anglo parents living in heavily Latino areas who had children in a bilingual-education program and who believed that learning Spanish is of little use to their child. Two explanations of Anglos’s opposition to bilingual education were compared: racial prejudice and protection of interests. The researchers assessed perception of educational group conflict, linguistic threat, economic threat, and racial prejudice.

Results showed that opposition to bilingual education originated with both prejudice and the perception of threat. Moreover, the researchers discovered an overlap between these two concepts that they found difficult to disentangle. Anglo opposition to bilingual education was associated with living in a heavily Latino area, perceiving educational conflict between Latinos and Anglos in terms of competition for resources, and negative feelings toward Latinos. Interestingly, Anglos who lived in Latino areas and could not speak Spanish were as strongly opposed to bilingual-education programs as those who lived in these areas and spoke Spanish. The authors speculated that fears about the spread of Spanish might have fueled some of the opposition to bilingual education programs. The results obtained by Clément and Kruidenier (1985) in the Canadian context support this hypothesis. They found that whereas positive attitudes toward the target language group promoted intergroup contact, second-language confidence, and motivation to learn their language, fear of assimilation acted as an equally strong deterrent.

Huddy and Sears (1995) argue that insecurity about social identity and English-language vitality among Anglos may be regarded as a “new racism” that material-
izes as resentment about minority-language use, competition for resources, and affirmative action. This “new racism” is implicit rather than overt. Overt statements of racism are rare, although they do occur. For example, in 1993, W. A. Craven (R-CA) disputed the right to public education of children of undocumented immigrants saying: “It seems rather strange that we go out of our way to take care of the rights of these individuals who are perhaps on the lower scale of our humanity” (quoted in Santa Ana, 1999, p. 220). Such statements generally lead to a public backlash, as was the case when the then-chairman of U.S. English, John Tanton, referring to the Hispanic birthrate, wrote, “Perhaps this the first instance in which those with their pants up are going to get caught with their pants down!” (quoted in Zentella, 1997, p. 74). U.S. English Executive Director Linda Chavez and board member Walter Cronkite felt it necessary to resign. Thus, it may be that the less overt forms of the so-called new racism are more likely to be tolerated and, therefore, are more detrimental (Johnson, 2000).

In line with the concept of new racism (Huddy & Sears, 1995), Hecht (1998) identifies four central metaphors for prejudice: as fear of difference, as dislike of difference, as competition with difference for scarce resources, and prejudice as hierarchy. Symbolic concerns about national identity among Whites appear to communicate prejudice based on fear of difference and concerns about status. A profile of English-only supporters revealed by a 1986 nationwide poll by the *New York Times*/Columbia Broadcasting System (cited in Fishman, 1988), documented age, education, and income. The findings partially mirrored the Frendreis and Tatalovich study in identifying older Whites in high income brackets as supporting English-only policies, with little or no support from Hispanics and other minorities. However, the greatest support came from Whites at the lowest income level. In striving for a favorable social identity (Giles et al., 1977), this group may seek the largest measure of differentiation from language minorities.

Prejudice can be expressed indirectly in terms of arguments about the importance of learning English, official English, affirmative action, or bilingual education (Asante, 1998; Hecht, 1998; van Dijk, 1987). Through this indirect process comes “deniability” (Hecht, 1998)—an opportunity to communicate fears about another group’s relative power and status while justifying it on other grounds.

Zentella (1997) examined support for official-English legislation, bilingual education, bilingual ballots, bilingual emergency telephone operators, bilingual advertisements, and unilingual foreign-language advertisements among six ethnic categories. Anglos stood alone in support for official English and showing increased support over time between 1988 (72%) and 1994 (78%). However, the results concerning the elimination of bilingual services revealed that the six ethnic groups (Puerto Ricans, Other Latinos, African Caribbeans, African Americans, Anglo Americans, and Others) were not so far apart in all language-policy matters. For example, regardless of their position on official-English legislation, all groups favored bilingual emergency telephone operators.

Interestingly, in regard to the linguistic landscape, language of advertisements, not bilingual education or bilingual ballots, stimulated the greatest disparity in opinions. All sample members made a clear distinction between their stand on official English (for and against) and their stand on public use of languages other
than English to provide assistance. This gives some credence to the view that the framing of an issue impacts its support, and that there may be a disparity between the views of those who author English-only initiatives and those who support them at the ballot box.

In a study of influences on attitudes towards the English-only movement, Giles and colleagues (1995), conducted an experiment to assess the effect of accented speakers delivering messages about English-only on attitudes for or against the issue. Results showed that Anglo-accented speakers were persuasive when they propounded an anti–English-only stance, whereas Hispanic-accented speakers were persuasive when they were pro–English-only. Anglos’s feelings of happiness and national identity were facilitated when ethnically similar-sounding speakers argued against English exclusivity. This has interesting implications for research into how proponents of English-only initiatives might manipulate messages to gain maximum support. Zentella (1990) highlighted the way in which authors of the English-only initiatives manipulate the wording of amendments to win by disassociating the amendment from its repercussions.

English Language Vitality Outside the U.S.

On an international level, English is “the language of globalization,” the lingua franca, the language of technology, academic research, and the information age (Efron, 2000; Ferrell & Hotz, 2000; Preisler, 2000). Far from decreasing in use, English predominates or is highly visible in a variety of domains. In Denmark, for example, “words and messages in English abound everywhere, most conspicuously on shop signs, posters, menus, etc. Advertisements especially are often partially or completely in English, in supermarkets, on the sides of buses, in newspapers and magazines” (Preisler, 2000). Moreover, Ferrell and Hotz (2000) report that, according to best estimates, English is the first language of 427 million people and the second language of 350 million. In Japan, a recent report to the government urged that English be taught in public schools as early as preschool. Tokyo University Professor Takashi Inoguchi argues that, without a good grasp of English, Japanese people “will be unable to quickly digest the latest technological advances around the world and also swiftly and effectively transmit news of their own advances. They will, in short, fall further behind in every way” (Efron, 2000, p. A12). Thus English is gaining ground in countries where the heritage language is not English.

Vitality and Language Policy in Other English-Speaking Countries

In the U.S., the English-only movement, as we have argued, has arisen with the perceived increase in vitality of Hispanic communities, resulting in a sense of threat among members of the Anglo majority. It is useful to compare this context to that of other English-speaking countries. Here, we examine three other multicultural, English-dominant countries, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Canada. Many English-only advocates in the U.S. mention Canada as an example of a nation being “torn apart” because of language policies that support multiple languages (e.g., Hayakawa, 1992; Murray, 1991; U.S. English, 1992). Although Aboriginal and other minority language communities are gaining increas-
ing recognition with regard to language issues, this discussion focuses on Canada’s two official languages, French and English. According to the 1996 Canadian census (Statistics Canada, 1999; see also Churchill, 1998), approximately 59% of the almost 29 million people who make up the Canadian population have English as a mother tongue, 23% have French, and 0.4% have both official languages as mother tongues. Of the remaining 16% who have a nonofficial language mother tongue, the most common languages are German, Ukrainian, Polish, and Chinese. Despite the large proportion of people with a nonofficial language background, most Canadians can speak English (66%), French (14%), or both official languages (17%).

In several respects Canada is similar to the U.S.: It is a former British colony that is now an immigrant nation and, thus, has many languages represented in its population. Drawing further parallels between the linguistic situation of Canada and that of the U.S., however, must be done cautiously for a number of reasons. First, the Canadian historical circumstances are very different than the American in that two language groups, the French and the English, played important roles in establishing European settlements in the territory now known as Canada. In the Treaty of Paris in 1763, France ceded New France to Great Britain. Since that time, although there are notable exceptions, such as the expulsion of the Acadians and the treatment of the Metis and French in Manitoba, the British have generally recognized the “French fact” of the North American territory.

An overview of English-French relations (based on Bourhis, 1994a) illustrates this point. For instance, the Quebec Act of 1771 guaranteed the maintenance of French civil laws and customs as well as freedom of worship and education in Quebec. In 1867 the British North America Act implicitly recognized French and English as official languages of the federal and Quebec legislatures. The 1938 Federal Civil Service Act required civil servants to be competent in the language (French or English) of the majority of persons to whom they provide services. The 1960 Bill of Rights guaranteed access to a French or English interpreter in a court. The most explicit recognition of the French language status followed from the 1963–1970 Canadian Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which resulted in the 1969 Official Languages Act. This Act made French and English the official languages of the federal government and guaranteed federal government services in French and English where the concentration of speakers exceeded 10% of the regional population.

A new Official Languages Act in 1988 broadened the scope of the original Act, particularly with regard to ensuring equitable participation of Anglophones and Francophones in the federal government (Fortier, 1994). In 1982, the Canadian constitution was patriated from Britain; in the process, Quebec’s right to veto constitutional amendments was dropped, and so Quebec refused to sign the agreement (Bourhis, 1994b). Since that time, a series of summits has attempted to bring about an agreement among the provinces, starting with the Meech Lake Accord (1987), which included an amendment to the Constitution Act, such that Quebec is recognized as a distinct society within Canada. This brief history shows that language issues (particularly English-French, but also Aboriginal and other minority languages [cf. Cummins, 1998; Drapeau, 1998]) have defined Canada since pr-Confederation. It might even be argued that, in the current process of negotiating
policy and practice regarding language rights (cf. MacMillan, 1998), Canada is still developing its linguistic identity. In some senses, then, it is misleading to say the country is “tearing itself apart” when these issues have been a part of Canadian society since its inception.

As much as linguistic concerns have centered in Canadian history, it is also important to recognize that divisions between the French and English are likely as much due to social and economic inequalities as language differences (Nunberg, 1992). Historically, French Canadians lived in insular rural communities where they were dominated by the Catholic church and had little interaction with English speakers (Lemco, 1992). The church encouraged French Canadians to retain an agrarian lifestyle and to avoid commerce. Anglophones thus came to dominate the economic, political, and social scene. In the 1960s, the Quebecois began to assert their rights as the numerical majority group. During the 1950s, “traditional” patterns began to change, and the “Quiet Revolution” of the 1960s restructured political, economic, and social systems (Hamers & Hummel, 1994). In part, this revolution was a process of “modernization,” involving a move away from an agrarian way of life, the extensive influence of the church, and poor political leadership (Hamers & Hummel, 1994). It also involved rejection of English-dominated society and a resurgence of pride in the French language. Thus, the separatist movement in Quebec would not seem to be premised solely on language issues, but rather a reaction to broader economic, social, and political disadvantage.

The current linguistic climate in Quebec (see Bourhis, in press) follows from these earlier events as the Quebecois have worked to maintain their culture and, particularly, their linguistic vitality, in an otherwise English-dominant continent. Considerable legislation has been enacted to protect and promote the French language within the province (see Barbaud, 1998; Bourhis, 1994b; Hamers & Hummel, 1994). For instance, in 1974, Bill 22 made French the official language of Quebec and prescribed its use in public administration, business, professions, and education. In 1977, the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) made French the only official language of the legislature and courts. Access to English-language education was restricted to children of a parent who had received most of his or her primary education in English in Quebec (this was broadened in 1984 to Canada). Larger companies were required to ensure that all English documents had a clearly visible French equivalent, and French had to be used on all public signs and posters. This situation has lead to a backlash from Anglophones and allophones, who found this legislation to be coercive (Hamers & Hummel, 1994). Many Anglophones left Quebec between 1976 and 1981, and some of those who remained began political action to reduce the predominance of French and promote bilingualism. Outside of Quebec, some cities and municipalities declared themselves unilingual English in reaction to Quebec’s restrictive policies. More recent legislation, such as Bill 86, modified the earlier bills to include the right to advertise with bilingual signs as long as French predominates.

Quebec is not alone in such discriminatory language policies; many other provinces in Canada, at one point or another, have promoted its majority official language (i.e., English), restricted access to services in its minority official language (i.e., French), or both. For instance, although the 1987 Manitoba Act declared
French and English as official languages of the Manitoba legislature and guaranteed access to education to both French Catholic and English Protestant schools, the 1890 Manitoba Official Languages Act then banned French from the Manitoba legislature, and, in 1916, the teaching of French was banned in all public schools. In Ontario, a 1912 regulation banned the teaching of French from all public schools, French Catholic private schools, hospitals, and parishes. In 1931, Saskatchewan declared English as the language of instruction in schools. Magnet (1990) suggests that it is these efforts to undermine minority language communities that have lead to political instability in Canada, not the fact of linguistic plurality per se. He states:

The Canadian experience thus teaches that the existence of two languages does not create the problem of separatism, or at least lead to social tensions. Separatism and political pathology grow in proportion as Canadian governments fail to deal with linguistic minorities generously and intelligently. It is the refusal to respect linguistic differences which leads to political difficulties in Canada, not the other way around. (p. 56)

In sum, then, the history of language policy in Canada has recognized the linguistic duality of the two founding European nations, and this history is considerably different from that of the U.S. The current state of the relations between the English and the French may involve language, but certainly broader concerns contribute substantially to the tensions between groups. Canadian provinces have a history of undermining the minority official language, and it is plausible that this attitude is more responsible for current difficulties than the fact of linguistic pluralism.

Although Canada is still faced with coming up with a happy resolution for all of its linguistic interests, the linguistic situation is not uniformly negative. When discussing Canada’s language situation, English-only advocates seldom point to those provinces and territories that are bi- or multilingual. For instance, New Brunswick is an officially bilingual province, in which two thirds of the population are English speaking and the remainder are French speaking (Leavitt, 1998). Many of the same concerns expressed elsewhere exist here, whereby Anglophones fear that they will place themselves at a disadvantage if they give too many rights to the minority Francophone group, and Francophones are resentful of the Anglophones’s hesitancy to make these privileges available (Steele, 1990). That said, the degree of political unrest underlying the separatist movement in Quebec (where arguably a monolingual official language policy is promoted) is not as extreme in this bilingual context. Other areas of Canada are officially multilingual. For instance, the Northwest Territories and the newly formed Nunavut Territory are both officially multilingual, including French, English, and six Aboriginal languages—Chipewyan, Dogrib, Slavey, Gwich’in, Inuktitut, and Cree. Further, the Yukon recognizes English, French, and the Yukon Aboriginal languages without designating an official language. Again, the political tensions evident in Quebec are not as prevalent in these territories, suggesting that factors other than official bi- or multilingualism contribute to strife between groups.

Australia. It has been suggested that Australia is the most multicultural country
in the world, while remaining essentially unilingual in English, the language of the
dominant majority (Clyne 1982; Gallois & Pittam, 1996). Despite the fact that
Australia is an increasingly immigrant nation (something like 40% are first- or
second-generation Australians), non-English-speaking immigrant groups rapidly
become English speaking, usually in one generation, and no group other than the
English-speaking majority can be described as having high objective vitality (Pittam,
Gallois, & Willemyns, 1991). In 1996, 85% of the population spoke only English at
home; the other 15% comprised speakers of more than 160 different languages
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999, p. 11). This linguistic diversity ensures that
no language other than English dominates in Australia. Even the most commonly
spoken languages other than English—Italian, Greek, Cantonese, Arabic, and Viet-
namese—are spoken by only small minorities, all less than 2.3% of the Australian
population, and the diverse range of indigenous languages are spoken by a mere
.3%. (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999). Despite the dominance of English as
the national language, government policy recognizes that Australia is both a
multicultural and multilingual nation. Indeed, the National Policy on Languages
(Lo Bianco, 1987) stressed the complementary nature of English and Australia’s
other languages. In recognition of the importance of linguistic diversity, the Na-
tional Policy on Languages recommended strategies to be implemented in areas
such as English and ESL teaching, languages other than English (LOTE), and Ab-
original education (see Clyne, 1997, 1998).

Yet the current reality of multilingualism in Australia is debated. Clyne (1998) is
relatively optimistic. He argues that there is no English-only legislation in Australia
nor any English-only movement that is gaining support for the undermining of
languages other than English. He reasons that, although every so often racist
views do emerge in society and attract a following, these are relatively short-lived,
because of the opposition of ethnic groups and the open-minded mainstream and
their mouthpieces (the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, and newspapers such
as The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald). Nonetheless, Clyne also acknowl-
dedges that the good intentions of the National Policy on Languages have been
undermined somewhat by the more recent Australian Language and Literacy Policy
(Dawkins, 1991). This policy stressed short-term economic goals and labor market
needs for languages other than English at the expense of socially motivated pro-
grams aimed at second-language acquisition and maintenance. Furthermore, there
was a strong emphasis placed on user-pays in ESL programs, an emphasis on
English literacy, and a marginalization of Aboriginal-language maintenance pro-
grams. Clyne (1998) identifies three major political factors that have undermined
the good intentions of the National Policy on Languages: (a) the general espousal
of economic rationalism, (b) an educational explosion in a basically utilitarian and
anti-intellectual society, and (c) the problems of defining advantage and disadvan-
tage in a self-described classless society.

In a similar vein, Bodi (1994) noted that the strategic policy change of direction
toward “Asia literacy” for the mainstream has resulted in diminishing support for
some smaller, mostly European languages and programs in favor of “priority”
languages such as Japanese, Bahasa, and Mandarin. Gibbons (1997) also argued that
despite the good intentions of the National Policy on Languages, LOTES are not
given enough attention in educational contexts and the problems of bilingual (or non-English-speaking) migrants at school are not sufficiently recognized.

Others are even more circumspect. For instance, May (1998) argued that within a culture of multiculturalism, there remains a tension between dominant and minority groups. In Australia’s case, the ongoing ascendency of the White Anglo-Celtic majority and the current political climate (the politics of discontent) mean that multiculturalism and multilingual public policy are anything but assured. May argued that the present national government has reverted to an assimilationist stance, and that there has been a concomitant rise in, and popularization of, racist rhetoric against Aborigines and Asian migrants. This tendency is exemplified by the well-publicized rise of the minority political party of Pauline Hanson. May believed that this is not just a passing fad, although Hanson’s party has recently experienced a dramatic fall in popularity from its zenith in 1998.

Likewise, Ager (1998) identified Hansonism as a backlash against elite policy that allowed the migrant community to get more than its fair share of resources. A large-scale national survey conducted by AGB:McNair on behalf of the Office of Multicultural Affairs (see Stefanik, 1990) found broad consensus on the importance of English for successful participation in Australian life and a less generous attitude toward adults who do not speak English. There was overwhelming support for the proposition that all Australians should be allowed to enjoy their own cultural heritage, and the opportunity to learn a second language in addition to English was favored very solidly across all population groups. However, patterns were far less unanimous when it came to ethno-specific services (run by and for an ethnic community). For instance, the general community’s support for language services weakened dramatically when they considered the provision of “special” services as an alternative to expanding generally available English-language services.

Anecdotal evidence also supports the notion that although Anglo Australians are generally reasonably tolerant of LOTES, a continuing minority is feeling threatened. For instance, Mackay (1993) related the sentiments of one Australian, including views on the linguistic landscape:

I do think they [Asians] should all be made to learn to speak English and I don’t think they should be allowed to put up signs on shops in a foreign language. This is our bloody country, after all, and you can’t read the signs on half the shops round some parts of Melbourne. (p. 168)

Much of the research in Australia on ethnolinguistic vitality has been conducted with immigrant groups (e.g., Hogg, D’Agata, & Abrams, 1989; Hogg & Rigoli, 1996; McNamara, 1987). To varying degrees, these studies have noted that low status is accorded to all migrant languages in Australia (Mackiewicz & Kee, 1986) and that majority group attitudes on this point are rapidly internalized by the migrants themselves (e.g., Callan & Gallois, 1982; Giles, Rosenthal, & Young, 1985). Equity and mobility for those with a less preferred language background are to be achieved more via English competence than through the maintenance of the mother tongue. However, studies that have systematically addressed perceptions of
ethnolinguistic vitality among the Anglo-Celtic majority have reported that the higher the potential for contact and the lower the education level, the more exaggerated the perceived vitality of minority languages relative to English. Pittam et al. (1991) concluded that the reality of daily life for Anglo Australian residents in suburbs with high concentrations of Vietnamese, coupled with stereotypic prejudices about Asians, lead to exaggerated perceptions of the relative vitality of Vietnamese, both now and in the future.

New Zealand. Like Australia, New Zealand has for some time been a multilingual and multicultural community as a result of immigration from non-English-speaking countries including those of Europe, the Pacific Islands, and various parts of Southeast Asia (Kaplan, 1994). About four fifths of New Zealanders are of European origin, predominantly from the British Isles. The indigenous Maori population makes up the next largest group of the population, about 14.5% in 1996, followed by Pacific Island people, who comprised 5.6% of the population in the 1996 census (New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1997). Although English is the first language of the great majority of New Zealanders, a range of languages including Maori, Samoan, Chinese, Gujarati, Greek, and Italian is spoken by reasonable numbers of New Zealanders (Holmes, 1997).

What distinguishes the New Zealand scene is the well-developed legislation and policy about the indigenous Maori language, which has provided the basis for strategic planning aimed at nurturing Maori (Holmes, 1997). Ironically, Maori is the only official language of New Zealand. It is widely represented in public signage, Maori terms are regularly used in English-based publications, and Maori may be used in courts. Nevertheless, there is still debate as to whether Maori should be represented in New Zealand postage, currency, passports, and other official contexts (Kaplan, 1994). In some respects, Maori shows high vitality and official recognition, and there is an increasing number of second-language speakers of Maori at the expense of immigrant languages. Even so, there is evidence that Maori functions largely as a ritual language and continues to be marginalized (Nicholson & Garland, 1991).

Despite the acceptance of Maori as an official language, Kaplan (1994, p. 157) argues that language issues have largely gone unnoticed across most strata of New Zealand society, and the government shows profound disinterest: “Many people seem unaware of the need for any language other than English; many others seem unaware of the probable real linguistic diversity of the New Zealand population.” As in Australia, immigrants to New Zealand complete language shift from their heritage tongue to the majority language of the society within a few generations (Roberts, 1991). However, a persistent minority (up to one fifth of the population) displays hostility to languages other than English and to issues of immigration and race more generally.

Informal conversations with individuals outside the academic sector (e.g., hotel staff, taxi drivers, airlines’ personnel, employees in various retail outlets, and even some teachers) right across several major cities . . . suggest that some percentage of adult Anglo New Zealanders hold rather negative feelings about Maori people . . . , about Asian immigrants, about Japanese, and about Pacific Islanders. (Kaplan, 1994, p. 157)
Moreover, Nicholson and Garland (1991) provide further evidence of minority resistance to the revitalization of the Maori language. Overall, Australia and New Zealand, like Canada, appear to have less lively and active English-only movements than the U.S. at the present time. Indeed, the situation in New Zealand and Canada is very similar; English is very dominant but there is a significant minority of speakers of one other language with relatively high vitality (Maori in New Zealand and French in Canada). In each of these three contexts, national governments of all political persuasions have explicitly acknowledged the bi- or multicultural nature of the country and the importance of maintaining diverse ethnolinguistic heritages. Nevertheless, the factors that predict advocacy of English-only in the U.S. appear to work in a similar way.

**Epilogue**

Generalized concern about the status of English represents a deeper fear about the vitality and status of the dominant Anglo majority. Currently available evidence suggests that insecurity about status among Anglos is unfounded. More research is required to understand how this seeming mismatch between the objective vitality of non-English-speaking groups and Anglos's subjective perceptions of the vitality of those groups relates to moves affecting language minorities limiting their access to education, information, and cultural tradition.

However, there are some competing influences at work. For example, in 1993, the greater Miami area in Florida (where Hispanics are in the majority) repealed official English in county government and the Arizona Supreme Court let stand a decision that the English-only rule illegally required state business to be conducted in English. The court said that the provision violated the First Amendment right to free speech by depriving non-English-speaking residents of access to government information and the ability to communicate with state agencies (“High Court Rejects Appeal,” 1999). Additionally, the California state auditor recently launched an investigation of publicly funded agencies to determine if they are complying with the state law requiring them to provide interpreters and standardized forms in languages other than English (Kondo, 1999).

The U.S. business community continues to exhibit a somewhat ambivalent attitude to language diversity in the workplace, ranging between applying pressures on language minorities to assimilate and implementing policies of adaptation to language diversity (Dicker, 1998). In a study exploring cultural differences in employee perceptions of social support received from sources in a multicultural organization, social support received from Anglo-American coworkers was found to be significantly related to Hispanics's emotional acculturation (Amason, Allen, & Holmes, 1999). Praise and help with personal problems emerged as the types of support most closely related to emotional acculturation. However, at the site of this study, support for minorities and cultural sensitivity to their language use were really only cursory at an organizational level. In that regard, the following quote from this study is telling:
While observing in one of the plant’s break rooms, we noticed a large poster prominently displayed in several locations. It showed a culturally diverse group of employees sitting around a table. Beneath the picture, the caption read “we are a culturally diverse workplace” and encouraged employees to value diversity. It was in English only and there were no translations. (p. 310)

The federal government’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) offers guidelines that deal with English-only rules in which it recognizes that “the primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin characteristic” (p. 294, quoted in Dicker, 1998). Employers are urged to apply English-only rules only where they can show an absolute necessity (e.g., safety). However, English-only advocates lobby for the right of employers to apply English-only in the workplace, and this practice shows consistent backing from the courts (Dicker, 1998).

There is a disjuncture between state and federal policy on English-only issues. Bilingual education in California is virtually outlawed. However, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (of which the United States is a signatory) states that (a) all individuals should have the right to the use their own language both in private and public; (b) the right to maintain and develop their own culture; to have their own language and culture taught; (c) the right of access to cultural services; (d) the right to an equitable presence of their language and culture in the communications media; and (e) the right to receive equitable attention in their own language from government bodies and in socio-economic relations (Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, 1999).

Bourhis and Marshall (1999) argue:

As a local, perhaps statewide, movement, “English-only” may still have some political life, but as a national issue, its fate is sealed, for neither the Democratic nor Republican party would wish to alienate its Spanish-speaking adherents by advocating such national legislation. (p. 251)

This remains to be seen. For despite such conflicting social forces, there appears to be no letup in the salience of the English-only issue, closely related initiatives, and increasing ambivalence surrounding their implications. We see no substantial change for the better since 1991, when Padilla and colleagues concluded that past and existing research evidence uncovered the substantially negative effects of the English-only movement.

This finding has long-term implications not just in the U.S., but also in international contexts where language purism reigns. For example, the world is experiencing rapid social and economic globalization, yet in several countries individuals speak only one language. With this in mind, how are unilingual English-speaking professionals perceived by their often multilingual economic partners? Further, how does unilingualism affect their negotiations and relationships? Does their unilingualism influence their perceptions of “others”? The evidence from the U.S. and other countries suggests that it does, but there is still important research to be done.
Communication scholars have much to do in this context, for, as we know, language and social identity are intertwined. Through the use of language, stereotypes are maintained and communicated in interpersonal networks of linguistic contact, through education, in the media, and in the linguistic landscape. When the perceptions of dominant language groups are based on inappropriate stereotypes associated with minority language groups, discrimination is often the outcome.

Two contexts of particular concern, in this respect, are the workplace and the school. Attitudes toward language use and promotion, and how these are communicated in these contexts, are crucial for the social identity and esteem of language groups. Additionally, the backdrop of linguistic landscape within everyday institutional environs may serve to bolster social dominance of one linguistic group over another.

Clearly, there is an important need to examine the rationale and outcome of policies encouraging English-only at work, at school, and in the linguistic landscape of a community. Communication scholars have a significant role to play both in terms of voicing concerns about such policies and in conducting relevant research about the effects of English-only on both minority- and majority-group members' perceptions of their own and others' language vitalities. To develop a greater understanding of the implications of the English-only movement varied backgrounds and methodological allegiances can, and should be, brought to bear. We suggest that there is research through which communication scholars can increase knowledge in this important area:

- Empirical work to test the relationship among support for English-only, subjective perceptions of vitality and measures of linguistic contact in institutional settings (e.g., education, the workplace, and media), as well as other links inherent in Figure 1 above.
- Investigation of perceptions of the prevalence of languages other than English in the linguistic landscape and how this relates to short- and long-term language use and subjective vitality.
- The impact of government language policy (at the national or state level) on vitality of languages other than English and support for English-only.
- Content analyses of representations of English-only and related issues in the media, to garner more evidence about how such media messages are framed and discussed.
- Experimental research using media stimuli to determine ways in which the media influences groups' perceptions of subjective vitality.
- Ethnographic research in organizational and institutional settings to reveal the ways that people from differing language groups communicate about and function in English-only environments.
- Qualitative and quantitative research describing the effects of English-only environments on social identity construction and adaptation, adjustment, and well-being.

As a new millennium begins, it is time for communication scholars to add their voices and research acumen to those in the fields of education and psychology.
who have long recognized the negative implications of language purism (Jernudd & Shapiro, 1989). The accumulating evidence suggests that “official English” may not be a well-founded policy. Certainly, a concerted effort in the conduct of empirically rigorous research is required, particularly given that political ideologies are heavily invested in the research findings. It is even possible that such research might point out limitations to multilingualism. Regardless, such research is essential for better policies and programs for language groups, in the U.S. and elsewhere.

References


